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                     IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
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                                      Case No. 4:23CR3019
      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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 4
                Plaintiff,
                                    )
 5
      VS.
 6
      ANTHONY UNOCIC,
                                         Lincoln, Nebraska
 7
                Defendant.
                                         January 4, 2024
                                    )
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                    TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS
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                    BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN M. GERRARD
                    SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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                            A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S
13
      FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
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      Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript
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      produced with computer.
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1 (At 8:59 a.m. on January 4, 2024; with counsel and the 2 defendant present:) 3 THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. We are on the record in United States of America versus Anthony Unocic. 4 is Case Number 4:23CR3019, and this matter comes on for 5 6 sentencing this morning with respect to Count I, influencing 7 and retaliating against a federal official by threat. Counsel, would you please enter your appearance. 8 9 MR. PACKARD: Dan Packard and Case Agent Lee Burkett 10 for the government. 11 THE COURT: All right. 12 MR. REIMAN: Korey Reiman for Mr. Unocic. 13 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Unocic is present in the 14 courtroom, and the probation officer, Craiq Ford, also appears 15 personally this morning. 16 Mr. Reiman, may I confirm with you that you have received 17 the Revised Presentence Investigation Report dated November 30 of 2023 and you've gone over the report and the Sentencing 18 Recommendation with your client? 19 20 MR. REIMAN: I have. 21 THE COURT: All right. Very well. This matter was 22 tried to a jury so there was no plea agreement in this case. 23 So that takes us to the presentence report itself, and 24 there were three -- I don't know if we want to call them

objections, but notations to the PSR, and I think those can be

25

fixed.

The first one was in paragraph 25, which was simply the AUSA statement or background statement. Paragraph 25, the first line -- and I'll be talking to the probation officer here -- says, "As a result of the investigation in 2016, Unocic pled guilty to a felony possession of explosive," and it should be attempted, felony attempted, yeah. And I know you were just quoting what the AUSA gave you.

PROBATION OFFICER: Right.

THE COURT: I'm presuming with the AUSA's consent that that can be corrected?

MR. PACKARD: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And that's consistent with paragraph 61.

Paragraph 83, that's on page 21. The second line said,
"The defendant does not have any tattoos." The defendant has
indicated that he has multiple tattoos, so we should probably
put that in there. I don't think that's going to make any
difference to anyone, but we will make sure it's corrected.

Paragraph 89, which is at page 22, the first line says,
"The defendant admitted he has been suicidal at times in his
life. In 2015, he attempted suicide by cop." The defendant is
stating that that was in 2019.

MR. REIMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And so that should be corrected.

And that's noted later in that paragraph, but that should be

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      corrected in line one.
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           Okay. So I will note those three corrections, and they
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      shall be made. Are there any other objections to the PSR?
           From the government.
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                MR. PACKARD: No, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Or from the defense.
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                MR. REIMAN: No, sir.
                THE COURT: All right. And I believe there are no
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      motions pending except for the motions for -- there's a motion
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      for upward variance and a motion for downward variance, and
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      I'll take those up at the time of allocution.
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           But with that I take it, then, that both parties would
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      like me to adopt the revised PSR with the changes that were
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      made?
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                MR. PACKARD: Yes, Your Honor.
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                MR. REIMAN: Yes, sir.
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                THE COURT: All right. And I will do so.
           And have each of you received the Sentencing
18
      Recommendation dated December 28?
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                MR. PACKARD: Yes, Your Honor.
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                MR. REIMAN: Yes, sir.
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                THE COURT: Mr. Unocic, let me go over the guideline
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      calculations with you. I'm sure your lawyer has.
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           The total offense level in your case is 20, and the
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      criminal history category is IV, so the guideline custody range
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      is 51 to 63 months. The quideline provision for supervised
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      release is one to three years. You're not eligible for
      probation under the guidelines. The fine range is 15,000 to
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      $150,000, and a special assessment of $100 is to be assessed.
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           Counsel, have I accurately stated the sentencing guideline
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      provisions?
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                MR. PACKARD: Yes, Your Honor.
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                MR. REIMAN: Yes, sir.
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                THE COURT: Okay. And I believe there's been no
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      request for restitution; is that right?
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                MR. PACKARD: That's right.
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                THE COURT: Okay. All right. Very well. Are you
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      both now prepared to proceed to sentencing?
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                MR. PACKARD: Yes, Your Honor.
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                MR. REIMAN: Yes, sir.
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                THE COURT: Okay. We'll proceed in the normal order.
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      I'll hear from the government first. There's a motion for
      upward variance as well as allocution. I'll take both of those
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      up, and then I'll hear from the defense with their motion for
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      downward variance and allocution so....
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           Mr. Packard.
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                MR. PACKARD: Thank you, Judge. With respect to my
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      comments, I'd like to offer some evidence, then make some
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      comments on my motion, then defendant's motion, and give a
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      short conclusion.
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           So with that I would ask you to consider Mr. Tubbs's
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      victim impact letter for purposes of evidence on the
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      government's motion for upward variance.
                THE COURT: And that has been filed, and the Court
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 5
      will take judicial notice of that. I assume there's no
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      objection to that?
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                MR. REIMAN: Correct.
                THE COURT: Or it will be filed. It should be filed
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 9
      sealed so....
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                MR. PACKARD: Thank you, Judge. I'll ask you to
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      consider --
                THE COURT: But you have seen it? I mean the defense
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13
      has seen it.
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                MR. REIMAN: Yeah.
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                THE COURT: Thank you.
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           Go ahead.
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                MR. PACKARD: I'll ask you to take notice of filing
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      83-1.
             That's a transcript of the defendant's July 5, 2022,
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      sentencing in the District of Wyoming.
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                THE COURT: All right. Any objection to that?
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                MR. REIMAN: No.
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                THE COURT: All right. I will take judicial notice
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      of that filing.
24
                MR. PACKARD: I'll ask you to take judicial notice of
25
      the Revised Presentence Investigation Report that the Court has
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accepted this morning.

THE COURT: I will take judicial notice of that.

MR. PACKARD: And then, lastly, I would ask you to consider the evidence which includes both testimony and exhibits adduced at trial between September 25 and September 28, 2023, in this court.

THE COURT: I was the trial judge, and I will take judicial notice of that and certainly will utilize those facts.

MR. PACKARD: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PACKARD: I have to admit from the beginning that my comments are biased. I'm biased in favor of Tubbs because, you know, just in my conversations with him, I understand just generally what things he's done and what law enforcement generally has to do, so you have to understand that my comments come with that bias. That's probably understood and I don't need to say it, but I think that's something to consider when I -- when the government moves for an upward variance.

It's really here I think the combination of the conduct with the defendant's circumstances and background which justifies the upward variance. The conduct in and of itself is mostly verbal stuff that happened, you know, before he even had a Wyoming sentencing, so this isn't a case where, you know, he was sentenced and then, after having that sentence, he engaged in further conduct.

So the government understands that this is conduct that his previous sentencing judge was already aware of, but it's a little different in that here you have a defendant who has the physical ability, the training, and the unique circumstances that place him in a dangerous position, and ultimately the Court can rely on protection of the public to incarcerate, and David Tubbs is a member of the public.

So with those general comments, the defendant's conduct was to threaten to kill Agent Tubbs on multiple occasions. And the statute 115, in that statute Congress ascribed a different penalty to threats to kill and threats to assault. Well, this was charged as a threats to assault. Not suggesting that defendant should be sentenced more seriously because it was a threat to kill, but it's an acknowledgement that the legislature does deem a threat to kill more seriously than a threat to assault, and I think that's part of the general sentencing factors the Court can consider.

And so in terms of the charging and the conviction compared to the factual basis, defendant has already somewhat received a favorable charging decision. Now, whether the guideline would have been different, probably not, but I think it's important to note that. The purpose of the statute is to hold people who threaten federal employees accountable but also to protect the David Tubbses of the world, and that's a valid consideration here in this case.

The victim impact statement, you kind of read between the lines, but there are some, you know, significant things that Mr. Tubbs will have to -- has had to deal with and will continue to have to deal with because of the defendant's conduct, and he may not have -- defendant may not have intended that, but that's where we are, and that's the result, and Tubbs will have to look over his shoulder. You can't change that, and that's a significant consideration.

I think also you look at these few -- we'll call them few -- verbal comments that was the defendant's conduct in context of his larger criminal history, and what we know is he was coming off a 2015 incident that was litigated for several years, and ultimately, I think in 2017, he was convicted. And we corrected it. It was a possession of -- attempted possession of explosive or incendiary parts out of Colorado.

But the factual basis there is concerning, because in his home he had firearms, ammunition, narcotics, a bomb-making manual, and explosive devices, and it was a reckless enough decision to where he was willing to, you know, put on gear and essentially goad police into shooting him, and that fortunately didn't happen, but that's kind of where he was mentally.

And then as soon as he gets out on that, he's ordering a suppressor from China, and he's hung up on whether the ATF pulled the trigger too soon on their investigation. You know, it's not, well, I messed up and that was stupid, I shouldn't

have done that. I mean, he's hung up on that. He ultimately ends up pleading in that case, but those are two felony convictions that are significant.

And so the question is: What's changed since then? And what we know from the PSR is that there are some significant mental health diagnoses as recently as 2021. There's also some relatively recent suicidal behavior. There's also evidence of narcotics addiction. So you throw all those things in the mix, and you see Mr. Unocic saying, at least in Wyoming a couple years ago, "I don't feel the need to have mental health treatment." That's a package or a combination of factors that makes the defendant, in the government's view, a dangerous individual, and it's worthy of consideration.

Not only do you have that recent history, but if you look at the PSR and you go back in time a bit, there's some pattern to this. And it appears as though, you know, he served his country well. He was a CO for about 12 years, and then things changed. So he's got a record of, you know, accomplishment, and he's able to study. He's a smart individual. But then things just kind of fell apart, and that's shown in the PSR.

You look at, for example, a drunk drive in 2004. Now, ultimately, that wasn't a conviction. 2006, plea withdrawn, successful completion of probation. But you look at the facts summary of that, and one of the comments is defendant was uncooperative and unwilling to participate in sobriety

maneuvers. BAC of .33.

Okay. Then you fast-forward three years. DWI, weapons possession. Ends up getting 60 days jail, probation. Part of the factual basis, defendant failed to cooperate with verbal commands, eventually arrested. Inside his car deputies located a .357 revolver, a loaded .22-caliber pistol, a second loaded magazine for the pistol, nine knives. That's 2007.

Fast-forward to 2010, you've got resisting arrest, you've got -- and then you've also got another resisting arrest, two within a month. He received 90 days for those. Factual basis: Police go to the residence. Diane, the mother, reports her son's out of control. Refuses to comply with verbal commands, puts his arms in the air, tells deputies he's armed. He's taken into custody. They locate a .22-caliber pistol and two additional magazines with Power-Point ammunition on his person.

Then, 2011, about eight months later, defendant crashes his bike. Police tried to help him, refuses multiple verbal commands. Ultimately detained after officers deploy OC spray.

So there hasn't been any sort of abatement in what appears to be dangerous behavior by the defendant which is characterized by an inability to follow court orders or orders from people trying to help keep the community safe, a possession of weapons continually, and when that isn't -- can't be done legally, possession illegally through the possession of ghost guns. And so it's that combination of his background and

the 3553(a) factors that the government believes makes the defendant a danger to the public and to Mr. Tubbs specifically.

The Wyoming sentence in 20- -- it's escaping me when that was, but I provided the transcript of that, and I largely provided that to the Court and the parties to show that the defendant did not receive any sort of separate penalty for his conduct that formed the basis of his conviction here and therefore --

THE COURT: You're talking the July 2022 sentence?

MR. PACKARD: That's right. I'm sorry. The

July 2022.

And so for that reason we're asking for a sentence that's consecutive to the Wyoming sentence. I think he has -- I think I calculated it till sometime in 2025, maybe, when he's finished with that, but we are asking for a consecutive sentence of six years, three years of supervised release that is consecutive to that Wyoming sentence. And on behalf of Mr. Tubbs, we would ask the Court to consider his victim impact statement.

With respect to defendant's motion for variance, the government would object to that. Mr. Reiman cited a couple cases which seem persuasive because it's time served on both of them and it looks like the conduct was, you know, equal to or more threatening than here. For example, U.S. v. Cessor, 26-year-old takes a handgun, gets in a truck, heads to D.C. to

shoot the President. He's convicted at trial. Guidelines, 51 to 63 months. He gets time served, which amounts to about 20 months.

You know, as the opposing party does, we look for distinguishing factors, and those are that he was 26, he had second thoughts several hours after leaving home, there was no evidence that he thought out a plan that would have in reality put the President in harm's way. That was from the opinion.

Here, defendant is 54. He has training. He's been in the Army, the National Guard. He's been a CO for 12 years, a correctional officer. He knows what it means when he says, "My retirement plan is prison." I mean, that has a special significance 'cause he's been there. He's seen what that life is like. He's grown up -- defendant's grown up with firearms. He has experience with ghost guns, silencers, and explosives. He's a drug user. He suffers mental illness that's untreated.

There's no evidence that he's abandoned his plan. The timeline in this case was the videos where he's making the stabbing motions. That's March 3 to March 5, 2022. He pleads March 10. That's about a week later, and that kind of happened after he got his paperwork. March 18 is when the email to Agent Sparks and Mike Elmore happened, and then March 21 is when Rivera does his first proffer. So you have the video, the plea, then the email.

And since that time there's really never been a retraction

like, "I'm not going to do that. I won't do that. That was a mistake. That was -- I was off my -- my mental illness." Now, that -- the defendant -- the counsel for defendant may say that, but what matters is what actual evidence is of that, and there's none of it. There's no evidence of retraction of that initial threat, so this case is distinguishable from Cessor.

Second case cited was *U.S. v. Wynn*, W-Y-N-N. A VA housekeeping aide makes multiple calls to the VA hotline threatening to kill or shoot a supervisor. He's mad about not getting overtime shifts. He's convicted of the same thing defendant has been in this case, and he's sentenced to time served.

Again, some notable differences. No suicide by cop behavior, no evidence of firearms or explosives experience, no information about the defendant's work in that case or background as a soldier or a correctional officer. He was not in custody in that case for ordering suppressors or putting together ghost guns or using methamphetamine. There was no history, at least noted in the opinion, of resisting or obstructing. The threats stopped after the defendant pled in that case, and there were none after sentencing. Excuse me.

As applied to this case, the argument goes the threats stopped after he pled and there have been none further after he was sentenced. Well, that shows he knows he was wrong. You know, this is not somebody who's just kind of off his rocker

just casually making threats. I mean, you can spin it both ways, but the government would suggest that, yes, he hasn't engaged in further threats, but by the same token, now it's time to keep quiet. He knows it's not okay to threaten Agent Tubbs.

So I think it's important to consider the flip side of the fact that there are no threats. The topic came up at the defendant's own sentencing on July 5th. So I hope that he's remorseful today, but he has an incentive to say, you know what, I made a mistake. I shouldn't have done it. There's an incentive now that he was convicted of it. He's incentivized to show good behavior.

So for those reasons we would object to the defendant's motion for variance. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Very well. Thank you, counsel.

Mr. Reiman, I will hear from you.

MR. REIMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Regarding the nature and circumstances of the --

THE COURT: I'm going to have you pull the microphone just a little closer.

Thank you.

MR. REIMAN: Regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense, Mr. Unocic, as many defendants are when they are faced with the evidence and the time that they are looking

at, become upset and work through those things, and I think that fits with the timing in this. Whether right or wrong, there was a warrant issued. You can say it was wrong, but upset with the warrant being issued that some of the facts about that -- whatever you call it, suppressor, solvent trap -- were told to the judge.

Again, I don't know that that matters, but he was working through this. Defendant was working through his emotions and maybe said a few things that were over the top to other people in that jail cell, but what happens is, as every defendant — not every defendant, but a lot of defendants do, is they calm down. They're in jail. They come to grips with that. Entered a plea on that case. I mean, he also — he also said in some of those statements he's going to trial no matter what on that case.

Well, what happens? The emotions calm down. You listen to your attorney, you listen to your friends, and he ends up pleading and gets sentenced on that conduct out there, and that's what happened here.

As I put in my brief, the guideline in this case acknowledges that this is -- it's a unique guideline in that they couldn't account for all the circumstances and facts of that, and in fact, it seems like the guideline encourages the Court to consider those factors 'cause the commission knows that they can't write a guideline very well for this type of

behavior.

THE COURT: And the Court -- I want both parties to know the Court understands that there's a wide variety. That's why, when we cite to Wynn and Ivers and other cases -- I mean I've considered all of those, and I will, but there's a whole continuum here --

MR. REIMAN: There is.

THE COURT: -- of what the retaliatory threats are, and I just want you to know the Court is very clear-eyed what the threats are in this case and so...but I agree with you so....

MR. REIMAN: The biggest factor that is not accounted for in that guideline is the lack of intent by Mr. Unocic to convey these threats to the actual victim. Certainly, you got that guideline. I would say -- a mine-run case, I think, is the term they use of when you're applying the guidelines would be somebody who is calling their victim, trying to instill fear in them, trying to mess with their life, repeatedly doing that. That's the type of behavior I think that that guideline is generally thinking of. What you have here is a person who had zero intent to convey or cause fear into the victim in this case.

Now, regarding the circumstances of the offense, the victim impact letter, I don't mean -- well, I am going to diminish. Maybe I do mean to diminish the angst that Agent

Tubbs has felt. But Mr. Unocic is in prison for three years, and this agent has this level of fear over someone who is sitting in prison? Maybe he got into the wrong line of work if he has that much fear of somebody who's sitting in prison for three years that it's affecting his daily life.

And maybe I'm -- maybe I'm too jaded because I was down the road for so long, but I compare -- but I think of domestic assaults and some of the violence that women have went through and the threats that they have, and I don't see this -- it just seems this is not more egregious than any other type of assault. I mean, there was no actual hands-on, you know? This is not any more egregious than the other type of threats.

Again, I keep going back to domestic assault or a domestic where the guy is screaming at the woman that he's going to kill her. That happens all the time, and this certainly isn't any more egregious than that. Agent Tubbs certainly can -- I mean, he has the training too. He has more than protection.

So history and circumstances of Mr. Unocic. You know, there is actually a lack of actual violence in his criminal record. There's not assaults in here. There's not assaults of an officer in here. He doesn't put his hands up when he's supposed to and disobeys the police when he's been arrested on this, but he's not assaulting the police officers. He's not assaulting other people. The violation of the protection order had to do with his father, who he sent a birthday card to.

Again, that's wrong, but it's not assaultive behavior.

The incident in Weld County, Colorado, he obviously had some type of mental break during that but -- and he wasn't charged with shooting at police officers, and I know they kind of made a deal about some bullets might have been in that general direction. He wasn't found guilty of that, and it just seems -- I don't know how you would be able to shoot at a police officer in a basement from a window well unless the police officer was standing directly over the window well and shooting up that, 'cause that's the way that house was laid out.

Mr. Unocic had come to terms with what he was facing after he was sentenced out there in Colorado. His plans were to care for his elderly mother, get a job, stay away from law enforcement, not to have any contact with law enforcement, lay low, get a job, and rebuild his life, and that's what he still wants to do. But in regards to unwarranted sentencing disparities -- and I do understand these cases are a wide variety, but there was no overt act to actually carry out this. It was just words said in a jail cell to other inmates. There was no intent to convey these threats or to cause fear within that officer.

And regarding the -- Mr. Packard brought up the statute and how this was charged. I always have had a problem with this, not that that matters, but it just seems odd that if --

if Mr. Unocic's words were, "I'm going to kill that agent so he doesn't testify," there would have been no crime in this because he would have lacked the intent, which just seems odd to me. But because it was charged as a threat with the intent to retaliate -- if the threat would have been so he doesn't testify, there's no crime there, 'cause there's a lack of intent there. But since it was charged as I'm going to harm this agent in retaliation, then all of a sudden it becomes a federal crime, which just seems kind of odd, odd to me that somebody -- you go from no crime to somebody who the government thinks should be sent to prison for six years.

THE COURT: And I'm sure you'll have that discussion in St. Louis or St. Paul or wherever the Eighth Circuit sits. We've gone through that one.

MR. REIMAN: But I do think that just to send somebody to prison for five, six years for words said in a jail cell in the heat of the moment with no intent to cause fear in the actual victim just seems crazy.

As I stated in my brief, we are asking for a sentence below a year in this case. We would ask the Court also to consider running supervised release concurrent with the three years that he already has on that Wyoming case. Thank you.

THE COURT: And somebody tell -- either you or the government, what is the status of the Wyoming sentence? Is there a release --

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                MR. REIMAN: It's March....
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                THE DEFENDANT: March 7th.
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                MR. REIMAN: March 7th, March 7.
                THE COURT: Pardon?
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                MR. REIMAN: March 7th of 2024.
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 6
                THE COURT: March 7th of this year?
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                MR. REIMAN: Yes.
                THE COURT: Okav.
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                MR. REIMAN: Yeah.
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                THE COURT: I'm just going to note that. I mean,
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      it'll be whatever it is --
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                MR. REIMAN: Yeah.
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                THE COURT: -- but as far as credit for time served,
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      I want to note that.
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           All right. Okay. Anything further, Mr. Reiman?
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                MR. REIMAN: No, sir. Thank you.
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                THE COURT: All right. Anything further from the
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      government in response?
                MR. PACKARD: Well, just that Mr. Reiman's point
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      about the nature and the continuum of the threat is well taken,
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      you know. Sometimes in county court here, worse words are
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      said, and you get a disturbing the peace, $500 fine and so --
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      you know, and what makes a federal agent different from the
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      average person on the street? Well, the statute makes it a
25
      special situation, but also it was that combination of
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Mr. Unocic's background and that Colorado explosives background that really changes the nexus here and makes it different from the usual situation.

And so I understand what Mr. Reiman is saying about whether Tubbs has thin skin, but truly from the git-go it was that history that really tuned law enforcement into this is some -- something different here, and that's a valid sentencing consideration. What is the defendant's background? You pair that up with what he said, and it's a dangerous combination, so that's where we're coming from. And it's important to acknowledge that there are threats every day that are just as serious on common citizens that get a \$500 fine, but, you know, this is a different situation from that. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Very well. Okay.

Mr. Unocic, at this time you do not have to speak. You don't have to say anything if you wish, but now is the time for you to address the Court if you wish to say anything to me before I pronounce sentence. Is there anything that you wish to say?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. You may do so.

THE DEFENDANT: There's just a few things that I'd like to talk about or explain. When the -- when I was arrested initially in 2021, I believe, in November, I was taken to the jail, and I was on several medications for depression, antipsychotics, medication for ADHD, things of that nature. I

did not receive any of those medications when I went to jail, so I went cold turkey off of all of my medications.

Then when I did arrive at Scotts Bluff, they had to give me a couple of the medications. Some of them they wouldn't, and they substituted it with a different medication that I've had bad reactions to in the past, including hallucinations, and this was in Weld County Jail in 2016.

Part of the reason that I was so angry and blowing off steam is because of my mother. My mother, she's 78 now, in very poor health. From the time I was arrested and during my current incarceration, she has fallen and broken an arm twice, and so she was able to use her Life Alert to get assistance, but now she no longer has a personal assistant. She had to move to a new apartment because she could not pay the rent, and currently right now they're about to kick her out of her current apartment because she can't pay the rent or pay her bills. In addition, she says the doctor wants her to go onto dialysis and things of this nature.

But anyways, I was very upset because my father had passed away when I was incarcerated, and my mother, she has no other family. Essentially it's just me and her, and I'm the one who helped her out and take care of her, and the thought of her passing away alone while I was incarcerated, just like I wasn't there to support her when my father passed away, was too much, and the roller-coaster ride of being on medications was

overwhelming.

I admit that, yes, I probably said some very bad things.

I don't agree with Mr. Hoops's version of what happened, but

I'm not here to argue that or discuss that. But as soon as I

was sentenced and got to prison, I kind of settled down with

what medications that I had available. I had completely

forgotten about Mr. Tubbs. All I focused on was getting out so

I could take care of my mother and help her out in her time of

need and be there for her when her time came to pass away, and

things were looking up, and then I get brought here and

blindsided by this indictment.

And, you know, now, you know, I never -- I -- Mr. Reiman reviewed the impact statement, victim's impact statement from Mr. Tubbs, and that was absolutely -- I had no intentions of anything like that occurring. You know, my circumstances when I made certain statements in jail, as Mr. Reiman pointed out, was I was not properly medicated. It was heat of the moment. I was concerned about not being there for my mother. When I received this, you know, I was looking at -- my initial indictment said that I had four charges and I was looking at zero to ten for each one with a maximum of 40 years. They dropped it down to two charges, which still was a zero to 20, and I was just overwhelmed with the stress of not being able to take care of my mother.

But when I was sentenced -- and I was sentenced to, you

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      know, more than I had pled to. I had agreed to 15 months.
2
      They gave me 33, but that was fine. It was still within the
 3
      realm of possibility for me to get out, get my life back
      together, and help my mom. And like we -- we just discussed,
 4
      my out date is March 7th, and that's the only thing that I've
 5
 6
      been looking forward to and planning on is being able to assist
 7
      my mother, and it just seems that this was just all -- it
      was -- I never intended for anything to get out of hand or come
 8
 9
      to this level. That was, you know -- you know, I feel bad
10
      about what happened, but I just want to let you know that there
11
      were other things going on that nobody seemed to be aware of
12
      that was affecting me mentally while I was in jail, but that's
13
      probably about all I have to say. Thank you, sir.
14
                THE COURT: All right. Very well. I will take all
      of that into consideration.
15
16
           Counsel, is there any reason that sentence should not now
17
      be pronounced?
18
                MR. PACKARD: No, Your Honor.
19
                MR. REIMAN: No, sir.
20
                THE COURT: All right. Very well. Well, Mr. Unocic,
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      I was, as you know, the trial judge in this particular case. I
22
      heard all of the witnesses and assessed their credibility.
23
      particular I assessed the credibility of Inmates Rivera and
24
      Hoops, which the Court and the jury found to be credible.
25
           Now, for sentencing purposes, I have considered all of the
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Section 3553(a) factors. That means I've considered the nature and circumstances of this offense. That means the exact type of threats that were had in this case. They were verbal. They were increasing. There was physical enactment. In other words, they were very specific. So this Court is very clear-eyed about what type of threats were involved in this case.

I've also noted, as your lawyer has argued, the fact that the threat was not made directly to the victim, and that plays a part in the sentencing in this case, but it certainly did get conveyed to the victim and very directly affected the victim, you know, and I understand the victim impact statement as it is. We all -- you know, everybody in this courtroom, whether they wear a robe or a badge or sitting at that table, are subject to offhand remarks. I don't think we'd want to go over to the Saline County Jail and see what people are saying about us, okay, but those are those type of remarks and that type of nature. This one went beyond that.

You know, and the two inmates that testified, Rivera and Hoops, they weren't looking for anything. In fact, this all started when Rivera talked to his lawyer, you know. There were very specific threats that were being discussed with Rivera and other inmates, and he was worried about the safety of this officer. That's the only reason he went to his lawyer. He wasn't looking for anything. That's how it began.

The ATF came and interviewed Hoops. Hoops wasn't looking for anything at that point in time, and Hoops very frankly said he thought that Mr. Unocic was full of crap in the beginning, I mean, didn't give the threats a lot of credence, and then they progressed and they -- I think he used the word they became scary. The defendant was obsessed. He was very serious. And so that's how the charges were brought in this case.

And as I noted in detail at the instruction conference, this was an intent to retaliate against officer case, so those threats need not be intended or be made directly to the officer. And I know you'll take that to the Circuit, and you can argue it at that point in time, but that's the law as I believe it to be. So I've considered what type of threats these were. These were not offhand remarks.

Now, I am going to sentence Mr. Unocic based on the threats and the remarks regardless of whether it was to a federal officer or anybody else. I mean, we've tossed around the term there are threats and people get \$500 fines. There aren't threats like this that get \$500 fines. But anyway, I've considered all of that as far as the nature and the circumstances of the crime.

I've considered Mr. Unocic's personal history, his work history, military history, his mental health history, and I'm going to order some mental health evaluation if he wants it.

We'll talk about that in a minute, but I've considered all of

1.3

that. I have considered his criminal history, and that means all of it, but in particular I've considered at paragraph 61 the conviction in Weld County, Colorado, the attempted possession of explosive, incendiary parts, and then, of course, the federal conviction out of Wyoming for possession and felon in possession of a firearm, so I've considered all of that.

I've considered unwarranted sentencing disparities, and I very specifically considered the Wynn case and the Ivers case and others. These circumstances are not the same. This was not a one-off remark. The government's witnesses were very specific about the incendiary nature of the remarks, the obsessing on this officer, the danger that it presented. And I've also considered Mr. Unocic's prior criminal history, and that is different than the others that were involved in the Wynn and the Ivers case.

So when I consider all of the Section 3553(a) factors, including the need to have the sentence reflect the serious nature of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to -- and to provide protection to the public in this instance and to provide just punishment for this particular offense, I will be pronouncing a 33-month sentence to be served consecutive to the very separate conviction that was imposed in the District of Wyoming.

So now to the sentence. Recognizing that the guidelines are advisory in nature and considering all of the

Section 3553(a) factors that I've just set forth, I hereby sentence the defendant, Anthony Unocic, to a term of 33 months in prison to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed out of the United States District Court of Wyoming, Docket Number 1:21CR-121-01J.

I am going to recommend -- if counsel wishes, I'm going to recommend RDAP.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I will -- because of your history of drug abuse, I am going to recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant participate in the 500-hour intensive drug treatment program or any similar and available drug treatment program, and that should commence relatively soon if you qualify for it. I'm not sure with the prior record whether you will or not, but I am going to strongly recommend that you participate in that.

I will further recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that you -- again, if counsel wishes -- receive a mental health -- a full mental health evaluation and that the Bureau of Prisons follow the recommendations of that mental health evaluation, whether it be medications or whatever the case may be, so I am going to recommend that.

I'm also recommending to the Bureau of Prisons that
Mr. Unocic be provided an opportunity to obtain further
education or vocational training appropriate to his current

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      education and skill level. You're 54 years old. You've got a
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      lot of life to live yet. The employment has not -- I think
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      that's been part of the issue, so I want you to get education
      or vocational training while you're there and come out
 4
 5
      productive again.
 6
           Counsel, is there a recommendation as to a federal
 7
      facility? Do you want it as close to somewhere in Colorado or
      what?
 8
 9
                MR. REIMAN: We had a long discussion about that.
10
      He's probably going back to Hazelton. That's where he was at.
11
      He's not a big fan of Hazelton 'cause apparently they don't
12
      have -- he was hop- -- Mr. Unocic, he's got a curious mind, and
13
      he actually was looking forward to all the vocational training.
14
      The problem is Hazelton doesn't have squat, apparently.
15
                THE COURT: Well, then, let's recommend somewhere
16
      that -- I mean, the Bureau of Prisons is going to classify him
17
      and place him as appropriate but --
18
                MR. REIMAN: Yeah. His only other concern was he
19
      does not want to go to --
                THE DEFENDANT: Florence.
20
21
                MR. REIMAN: -- Florence, because he's concerned he's
22
      going to run into some of the same people he was a guard over
23
      years ago, so he doesn't want to go there.
24
                THE COURT: Yeah.
                                   Okay.
25
                THE DEFENDANT: Maybe Sheridan.
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1 THE COURT: I may make no -- other than not go to 2 Florence, I mean, I may make no recommendation. 3 MR. REIMAN: Would -- is Sheridan a medium security? THE COURT: What's that? 4 MR. REIMAN: Sheridan, Oregon, is a medium security, 5 6 and that's what he is right now, I suspect. 7 THE COURT: That's a solid -- I've not had anybody go. I know right where it's at, and that would be appropriate. 8 9 All right. So I will recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that 10 the defendant be incarcerated in a federal facility as close to 11 Sheridan, Oregon. 12 I don't know if it's Sheridan FCI or what. Kathy, you'll 13 look that up, but it's Sheridan, Oregon. 14 MR. REIMAN: Yes. 15 THE COURT: So I will recommend that, and I will also 16 specifically recommend that he not be incarcerated in Florence, 17 Colorado. I will make that specific recommendation. Again, 18 the Bureau of Prisons will classify you and place you as 19 appropriate, but they oftentimes will follow that 20 recommendation, and so I will make that recommendation. 21 Mr. Unocic shall be placed on three years of supervised 22 release once he's released from prison, and that will be served 23 concurrently with the sentence of -- you're going to be 24 getting -- you're not going to be getting out until after this 25 sentence is served, so it'll be a three-year supervised release

to be served concurrently with that supervised release that was imposed in Docket 1:21CR-121, but I do intend to follow the special conditions of supervised release set out at the end of the revised PSR in this case.

Do the parties have any objection to any of those special conditions?

MR. PACKARD: No, Your Honor.

MR. REIMAN: No. Mr. Unocic and I went over those.

THE COURT: What's that?

MR. REIMAN: Mr. Unocic and I did go over those.

THE COURT: So the special conditions of supervised release set out in the revised PSR are imposed, and the standard conditions in the Court's judgment will also apply.

I'm not going to impose a fine because the defendant could not pay one and is not expected to be able to pay one in the foreseeable future.

A \$100 special assessment will be imposed.

And the defendant normally would be given credit for time served. There is no credit. I should probably note that the consecutive sentence will commence at the end of the Wyoming term, which is anticipated to be March 7 of 2024, but I'll just note that in the JCC, but it is whatever it is and so....

And if he's not already done so, the defendant shall cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample at the direction of the Bureau of Prisons.

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Now, in crafting this order I have considered all factors in determining this sentence should be sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of Section 3553(a). So that is my judgment and sentence. Counsel, do either one of you have any questions or would like any further elaboration of either my sentence or statement of reasons? MR. PACKARD: No, Your Honor. MR. REIMAN: No, sir. Thank you. THE COURT: Pardon? MR. REIMAN: No, sir. Thank you. THE COURT: All right. Very well. Mr. Unocic, you do have a right to appeal this matter to a higher court, and you have 14 days in which to file an appeal, and if you wish to do so, you should talk with Mr. Reiman. In just a few moments, my courtroom deputy is going to give you a sheet of paper -- or it may be there now -- that sets forth your appeal rights. They're essentially what I just told you, you have 14 days in which to file an appeal. Do you have any questions about your right to appeal or the procedures involved? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: All right. Very well. Anything else that we need to take up from the government?

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                MR. PACKARD: No, Your Honor.
 2
                THE COURT: Or from you, Mr. Reiman?
 3
                MR. REIMAN: No, sir. Thank you.
                THE COURT: All right. Mr. Unocic, good luck to you.
 4
 5
      Stay away from weapons, stay away from others, and we likely
      won't see each other again. All right?
 6
 7
                THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head.)
 8
                THE COURT: Thank you. We stand adjourned.
 9
           (Adjourned at 9:48 a.m.)
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13
           I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
14
      the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
15
16
17
               /s/Lisa G. Grimminger
                                                    February 6, 2024
               Lisa G. Grimminger, RDR, CRR, CRC Date
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